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SELF-HELP IN THE COLLECTION OF DEBTS AS A DEFENSE
TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Adverse economic conditions present the spectacle of petty
creditors going to unusual lengths to collect. Some apply cajol-
ery, trickery, threats, even force in attempting to secure pay-
ments. But save in instances of self-defense, recaption and repri-
sals, entry on lands, the abatement of nuisances, and distraint,
the right to self-redress is not recognized,' because
The public peace is a superior consideration to any one
man's private property; and * * * , if individuals were once
allowed to use private force as a remedy for private injuries,
all social justice must cease, the strong would give law to
the weak, and every man would revert to a state of nature;
for these reasons it is provided that this natural right * * *
shall never be exercised where such exertion must occasion
strife and bodily contention, or endanger the peace of so-
ciety.2
To repress completely the exercise of self-help is seemingly
impossible, and perhaps undesirable.3 Human nature revolts
against too stringent control but generally acquiesces to aid the
law when individual rights and benefits are concerned. In cog-
nizance of this problem, this note attempts to survey criminal
law problems resulting from the unauthorized collection of debts.
Larceny. According to some courts, it would seem that the
gravamen of the offense of larceny is the lack of color of right
or excuse in taking and carrying away the personal property of
another.4 These courts have adopted the general rule that one
who openly and avowedly takes the property of another without
the latter's consent is, no matter what technical name be applied
to the acts, not guilty of larceny, provided the property be taken
1. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd ed. 1923) 278 et seq. This
has not always been the situation. There has been a gradual evolution from
the time when the law was unable to prevent self-help of the most violent
kind, through a period of strictum ius, to the present-day moderate status.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1923) 574.
2. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 1021.
3. 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd ed. 1923) 100. The Amer-
ican Law Institute apparently recognizes the necessity of tolerating the
existence of self-help. See Restatement, Torts (1934) sees. 88-111, 128;
Restatement, Restitution (1937) see. 4 (a).
4. State v. Sawyer (1920) 95 Conn. 34, 110 AtI. 461, 13 A. L. R. 139;
Regina v. Holloway (Exeb. 1848) 2 Car. & K. 942, 175 Eng. Rep. 395;
Riley v. State (Okla. Cr. App. 1938) 78 P. (2d) 712; 1 Bishop, New Criminal
Law (8th ed. 1892) 896, sec. 849. Cf. People v. Barnes (1913) 158 App.
Div. 712, 143 N. Y. S. 885, where the president of a corporation, which
was indebted to him, was found guilty of larceny when he took funds equal
to the indebtedness, but not as payment of it.
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in settlement or partial settlement of a bona fide debt due him
from the owner of the property.5 Furthermore, if the creditor,
although mistaken, honestly believes that he has a right to col-
lect a debt in this manner,6 or that the owner approves of the
application of the property to the debt,7 there can be no larceny
because of the absence of any animus furandi.
If the property is taken as security for the debt, and the
creditor intends to restore it to the debtor when the debt is paid,
there is a sufficient color of right or excuse for the act and the
taking is not larceny.8 But this defense is lost if the taker re-
fuses to allow the debtor to reclaim on payment of the sum due.,
Some courts, which follow the above theory, hold that one of
the essentials of larceny is a secret taking.1 They conclude there-
fore that an open taking is a good defense to the charge of lar-
ceny, and that the open taking can be used only as evidence of a
trespass., Other jurisdictions, though following the general
5. Johnson v. State (1883) 73 Ala. 523; Buchanan v. State (Miss. 1889)
5 So. 617; Lawrence v. State (1882) 11 Tex. App. 306; 1 Bishop, New
Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) 896, sec. 849, which states the general rule
thus: "In larceny, if the object of the taker was to compel through an
irregular way, the owner of the goods to do what the law required him to
do with them, namely, pay his debt, there is no legal principle rendering
the act a felony."
6. Cases holding no larceny in the presence of bona fide belief: Brand v.
State (1935) 26 Ala. App. 286, 158 So. 769; Johnson v. State (1883) 73
Ala. 523; People v. Eastman (1888) 77 Cal. 171, 19 Pac. 266; People v.
Morley (1928) 89 Cal. App. 451, 265 Pac. 276; State v. Bond (1854) 4
Iowa 540; Commonwealth v. Stebbins (1857) 8 Gray (74 Mass.) 492;
Lawrence v. State (1881) 11 Tex. App. 306; Wolf v. State (1883) 14 Tex.
App. 210; Young v. State (1895) 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 290, 30 S. W. 238;
Fogel v. State (1932) 101 Tex. Cr. Rep. 594, 50 S. W. (2d) 333; State v.
Williams (1910) 68 W. Va. 86, 69 S. E. 474, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 144.
Cases holding larceny committed in the absence of bona fide belief: Com-
monwealth v. Peakes (1918) 231 Mass. 449, 121 N. E. 420; Gettinger v.
State (1882) 13 Neb. 308, 14 N. W. 403; People v. Solomon (1896) 12
App. Div. 627, 42 N. Y. S. 573. The belief must be a reasonable one. Lan-
caster v. State (1866) 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 340, 91 Am. Dec. 288.
7. State v. Williams (1888) 95 Mo. 247, 8 S. W. 217, 6 Am. St. Rep.
46; and see Bunch v. State (1917) 81 Tex. Cr. Rep. 171, 194 S. W. 144
(where defendant took money to pay owner's room rent).
8. In re Bayles (1920) 47 Cal. App. 517, 190 Pac. 1034; State v. Sawyer
(1920) 95 Conn. 34, 110 Atl. 461, 13 A. L. R. 139; Simpson v. State (1895)
(Tex. Cr. App. 1906) 96 S. W. 925.
9. Young v. State (1895) 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 290, 30 S. W. 238.
10. People v. Ranney (1932) 123 Cal. App. 403, 11 P. (2d) 405.
11. Johnson v. State (1883) 73 Ala. 523. One of the requisite elements
of the crime of larceny is a trespass. Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 340,
sec. 109. There may be a criminal trespass at common law, however, even
though the taking does not constitute larceny. People v. Sheasbery (1927)
82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836; State v. Sawyer (1920) 95 Conn. 34, 110
Atl. 461, 13 A. L. R. 139; People v. Hillhouse (1890) 80 Mich. 580, 45
N. W. 484; State v. Delk (1937) 212 N. C. 631, 194 S. E. 94; Wolf v.
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rule, refuse to recognize this branch of the doctrine but allow
evidence of secrecy to go to prove the fraudulent intent.12
A minority of courts maintains the conservative position that
the defense cannot be made that the property was taken in satis-
faction of, or as security for, a debt.1 3 They hold that the law
does not under any circumstances "permit a creditor to make
collection of what is due him by larceny of the debtor's goods."'1
Courts maintaining this position overlook the fact that the de-
fendant acted under the guise of an honest belief, and recognize
only the existing situation wherein the taker seized the property
with intent to appropriate to his own use.
The distinction between the minority and majority rulings is
illustrated in Commonwealth v. Stebbins,21 where the court re-
fused to instruct the jury that if the creditor appropriated or
intended to appropriate the money taken to the payment of a
note which or any part of which the debtor was legally liable to
pay, it would not be such a conversion to her use as would be
necessary to constitute larceny. Instead the court charged that
if the creditor took the "money under an honest belief that she
had a legal right to take this specified money in the way and
under the circumstances that she did take it,""' she would not be
guilty of larceny.
No uniformity is found in the statutes of the various states
in defining "larceny." Some specifically require a felonious in-
tent to "steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal prop-
erty of another." 17 Others simply declare a certain act to con-
State (1883) 14 Tex. App. 210; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1441,
sec. 1125. Unlike larceny criminal trespass does not require an unlawful
intent. State v. Deal (1870) 64 N. C. 270. Some states have passed
statutes supplementing and often overlapping the common law crime. Like
larceny statutes, not all require criminal intent. Sears and Weihofen, May's
Criminal Law (1938) 147, sec. 113. See notes 17 and 18, infra.
12. Johnson v. State (1883) 73 Ala. 523; People v. Eastman (1888) 77
Cal. 171, 19 Pac. 2A6; Buchanan v. State (Miss. 1889) 5 So. 617; Butler
v. State (1878) 3 Tex. App. 403; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1471,
see. 1154.
13. McKenzie v. State (1910) 8 Ga. App. 124, 68 S. E. 622; State v.
Williams (1888) 95 Mo. 247, 8 S. W. 217, 6 Am. St. Rep. 46; Common-
wealth v. Peakes (1919) 231 Mass. 449, 121 N. E. 420; Gettinger v. State(1882) 13 Neb. 308. 14 N. W. 403; People v. Solomon (1896) 12 App. Div.
627, 42 N. Y. S. 573; Greene v. Fankhauser (1910) 137 App. Div. 124, 121
N. Y. S. 1004; Butler v. State (1878) 3 Tex. App. 403.
14. Gettinger v. State (1882) 13 Neb. 308, 14 N. W. 403, 405.
15. (1857) 8 Gray (74 Mass.) 492.
16. Id. at 493.
17. Cal. Penal Code (1937) see. 484. See Ex parte Bayles (1920) 47
Cal. App. 517, 190 Pac. 1034; People v. Morley (1928) 89 Cal. App. 451,
265 Pac. 276; 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 197, sec. 143, n. 19.
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stitute larceny, without mentioning intent as an element. 18 Only
under statutes of this latter type has it been held that the major-
ity rule does not apply.19 The intent required is merely the intent
to do the prohibited act.20 The reason for this discrepancy in
the statutes is apparently that where the defense of a bona fide
intent is allowed, the injured party can usually be amply com-
pensated in damages in a civil proceeding for the wrongful de-
tention of his property. This view neither condones nor invites
the commission of crime, inasmuch as the accused must pay the
penalty for the perpetration of any applicable crimes.
Robbery. Robbery includes the elements of the crime of lar-
ceny, 21 differing only in respect to the taking, which is by force
or intimidation.22 As with larceny, the courts have disagreed on
whether the collection in such manner of a debt honestly believed
to be due constitutes robbery.
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that an indict-
ment for robbery, or assault to commit robbery, will fail where
there is an intent on the part of the defendant to collect or obtain
security for a bona fide debt.23 To constitute robbery there must
18. N. Y. Penal Code (1930) sec. 1306. See 1 Wharton, Criminal Law
(1932) 197, see. 143, n. 18.
19. J. W. Matthews & Co. v. Employers' 'Liability Assur. Corp. (1908)
127 App. Div. 125, 111 N. Y. S. 76; Greene v. Fankhauser (1910) 137 App.
Div. 124, 121 N. Y. S. 1004.
20. Greene v. Fankhauser (1910) 137 App. Div. 124, 121 N. Y. S. 1004.
21. State v. Byers (1926) 136 Wash. 620, 241 Pac. 9.
22. People v. Clary (1887) 72 Cal. 59, 13 Pac. 77; State v. Wasson
(1905) 126 Iowa 320, 101 N. W. 1125; Commonwealth v. Clifford (1851)
8 Cush. (62 Mass.) 215.
The courts generally hold that the application of force with intent to
collect a debt is at least an assault and battery. Ward v. State (1856) 28
Ala. 53; Wilkerson v. State (1915) 12 Ala. App. 100, 68 So. 475; Butts v.
Commonwealth (1926) 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764. But in those jurisdic-
tions where an intent to do bodily harm is required, evidence that the ac-
cused acted to collect a debt may be admissible as a defense. Miller,
Criminal Law (1932) 302, sec. 98 (b); Sears and Weihofen, May's Criminal
Law (1938) 257, sec. 157.
23. Cases involving intent to collect: Bauer v. State (1925) 45 Ariz.
358, 43 P. (2d) 203; Crawford v. State (1892) 90 Ga. 701, 77 S. W. 628,
35 Am. St. Rep. 242, 9 Am. Cr. Rep. 587; State v. Hollyway (1875)
41 Iowa 200, 28 Am. Rep. 586; State v. Brown (1891) 104 Mo. 365, 16
S. W. 406; State v. Carroll (1900) 100 Mo. 368, 60 S. W. 1087; and see
Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1081. Cases involving intent to obtain security:
Johnson v. State (1883) 73 Ala. 523; People v. Eastman (1888) 77 Cal.
171, 19 Pac. 266; State v. Hollyway (1875) 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586;
Buchanan v. State (Miss. 1889) 5 So. 617; Young v. State (1896) 37 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 457, 36 S. W. 272; Butts v. Commonwealth (1926) 145 Va. 800, 133
S. W. 764. One retaking property stolen from him is not guilty of robbery.
Analytis v. People (1920) 68 Colo. 74, 118 Pac. 1113; Johnson v. State
(1923) 24 Okla. Cr. Rep. 320, 218 Pac. 179; Glenn v. State (1906) 49 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 349, 92 S. W. 806.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/11
be an animus furandi, which cannot exist where the property is
taken in good faith.2
This view prevails even where the creditor attempts to take
money, not from the debtor himself, but from the debtor's agent,
so long as a semblance of right can be found to exist in the
creditor.2 5 But the defense of a lack of felonious intent fails in
any event when one takes more than is due26 or when there is
no honest belief of ownership or agency.2 7
It has been suggested that the courts are reluctant to convict
a creditor of such a serious crime because of the extenuating cir-
cumstances which are present.2s This would seem to have been
the case where a poor farmer, faced with the necessity of obtain-
ing food and medicine, took by threats of violence money due him
which was being withheld because of a previously undisclosed
note for the payment of which he was responsible. 29 Likewise,
the taker would appear to be justified in forcibly collecting un-
paid wages after being discharged when to his knowledge there
existed no reason to withhold them.", An even more convincing
case is presented where, after receiving legal advice, an install-
ment collector retook property for failure to make payments.3 1
Thus, when a great need exists for immediate redress, or when
there is an undisputed debt which would be difficult or costly to
collect, a conviction of robbery would not seem to be justified.
A civil suit will redress any unlawful conversion, 32 and a criminal
24. Bauer v. State (1925) 45 Ariz. 358, 43 P. (2d) 203; People v. East-
man (1888) 77 Cal. 171, 19 Pac. 266; People v. Sheasbery (1927) 82 Cal.
App. 459, 255 Pac. 836; Regina v. Hemmings (N. P. 1864) 4 Fost. & F.
50, 176 Eng. Rep. 462; Crawford v. State (1893) 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. E.
628, 35 Am. St. Rep. 242, 9 Am. Cr. Rep. 587; State v. Hollyway (1875)
41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586; State v. Brown (1891) 104 Mo. 365, 16
S. W. 406; State v. Culpepper (1922) 293 Mo. 249, 238 S. W. 801; Young
v. State (1896) 37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 457, 36 S. W. 272; Butts v. Commonwealth
(1926) 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764; and see Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1081.
25. Regina v. Boden (1844) 1 Car. & K. 395, 174 Eng. Rep. 863; Cham-
bers v. State (1884) 62 Miss. 108; Herber v. State (1851) 7 Tex. 69.
26. Crawford v. State (1892) 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. W. 628, 35 Am. St. Rep.
242; State v. Hollyway (1875) 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586; State v.
Brown (1891) 104 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 406; State v. Carroll (1900) 160 Mo.
368. 60 S. W. 1087. -
27. Crawford v. State (1892) 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. W. 628, 35 Am. St. Rep.
242; State v. Hunt (1877) 45 Iowa 673.
28. Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 151.
29. State v. Hollyway (1895) 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586.
30. Butts v. Commonwealth (1926) 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764.
31. People v. Sheasbery (1927) 82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836.
32. See in this connection White v. Yawkey (1896) 108 Ala. 270, 19
So. 360, 54 Am. St. Rep. 159, 32 L. R. A. 199; Murphy v. Hobbs (1885)
8 Colo. 17, 5 Pac. 637; Goulding v. Harbury (1892) 85 Me. 227, 27 Atl.
127, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357; Kenney v. Ranney (1893) 96 Mich. 617, 55 N. W.
982; Williams v. Deen (1893) 5 Tex. Civ. App. 575, 24 S. W. 536.
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suit for assault and battery or trespass will amply satisfy the
demands of the state for any breach of the public peace.33
The minority view is illustrated by Fannin v. State,"' which
holds it robbery for one to compel another to pay a sum of money
which the assailant claims the other owes him, even though the
claim is not disputed by the other. The court said that "no man
has a right * * * to take the law into his own hands, and at
the point of a sixshooter, putting his debtor in fear of life or
serious bodily injury, collect a debt, however just."3' Another
argument was advanced in a Georgia case, 36 which, while adher-
ing to the rule that animus furandi is an essential element of
robbery, seems to have held that if the taking is by intimidation
or force, it constitutes robbery. This view places emphasis on
a radically different criterion in defining the crime. It appears
that the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning would de-
mand the abolition of all defenses where the slightest degree of
force is used. Under this analysis, taking is lawful only if by
voluntary consent of the owner or by due process of law.3 7
Tipton v. State,3 which adheres to the minority rule, makes
a distinction between attempts to collect on liquidated and un-
liquidated obligations. The court argued there that to hold that
the forcible collection of an unliquidated debt is not robbery
would be "an invitation to aggrieved persons to assume the
function of judge, jury, and sheriff to violently and forcibly com-
pensate themselves for the injury or assumed injury inflicted, to
33. See People v. Sheasbery (1927) 82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836;
Regina v. Hemmings (N. P. 1861) 4 Fost. & F. 50, 176 Eng. Rep. 462;
Butts v. Commonwealth (1926) 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764; 2 Wharton,
Criminal Law (1932) 1379, sec. 1085.
34. (1907) 51 Tex. Cr. Rep. 41, 100 S. W. 916, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.)
744, 123 Am. St. Rep. 874.
35. Id. at 45, 100 S. W. at 918.
36. Holland v. State (1910) 8 Ga. App. 202, 68 S. E. 361, 862, where the
court said: "The words 'with intent to steal' mean to wrongfully appropri-
ate to their own use; and ift they by intimidation forced him, or he from
intimidation paid over the money, and they took it intending to use it or
keep it, then they would be guilty." Cf. Tipton v. State (1923) 23 Okla.
Cr. Rep. 86, 212 Pac. 612, 31 A. L. R. 1074, which extends this theory by
holding that "the taking of something of value from another, by means
of force or fear of injury, is the gist of the offense of robbery; whether
the motive leading up to the assault grew out of avarice, revenge, or curi-
osity is immaterial."
37. Thomas v. State (1933) 165 Miss. 897, 148 So. 225; State v. Gill(1898) 21 Mont. 151, 53 Pac. 184.
38. (1923) 23 Okla. Cr. Rep. 86, 212 Pac. 612, 31 A. L. R. 1074. In
accord see Thomas v. State (1933) 165 Miss. 897, 148 So. 225; Kinsey v.
State (1931) 50 Okla. Cr. Rep. 258, 296 Pac. 1002; Fannin v. State (1907)
51 Tex. Cr. Rep. 41, 100 S. W. 916, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 744, 123 Am. St.
Rep. 874.
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any extent deemed adequate by the aggrieved person alone, and
that such violence would amount to no more than a mere tres-
pass or simple assault."39 Obviously the collection of unliquidated
debts by force is of more doubtful propriety than the collection
of liquidated debts. Therefore, the court in the latter instance
may well be justified in being lenient, inasmuch as the taker
does not put upon himself the burden of saying what and how
much his debt and recovery should have been.
In most states the robbery statutes merely reassert the com-
mon law definition and require the same intent as under the
common law.40 The lack of a felonious intent is thus generally
a valid defense.-' Recent legislation does not require that an
intent be charged or proved,42 the only defenses under them be-
ing that the taking was with the consent of the one alleged to
have been robbed.43
Forgery. While the problem has rarely been presented, never-
theless there is a division of opinion as to whether it is a valid
defense that the accused believed that he had a right to apply
money obtained by forgery to the payment of a claim which he
held against the person whose name he forged.
In some jurisdictions the criminal intent which the law infers
from forging an instrument and using it as evidence against the
person whose name is forged can be negatived by proof that the
debt was really a just one.44 These courts hold that no crime
exists, as there is neither the requisite intent to defraud45 nor
a prejudice of another's right.4e
In a greater number of jurisdictions, however, when similar
acts of forgery are committed in order to collect on an outstand-
ing indebtedness, the requisite criminal intent is found to exist:
The intent to injure and defraud required, being a general intent
39. See 23 Okla. Cr. Rep. at 94, 212 Pac. at 616.
40. People v. Shuler (1865) 28 Cal. 490; People v. Locke (1936) 275
Mich. 333, 266 N. W. 370; State v. Gorham (1875) 55 N. H. 152; see also
R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 4058, 4059, and 4060.
41. Bauer v. State (1935) 45 Ariz. 358, 43 P. (2d) 203, which decision
is reached on the basis of Arizona Rev. Code (1928) sec. 4602.
42. People v. Emerling (1930) 341 I1. 424, 173 N. E. 474 (intent im-
material in robbery committed with dangerous weapon) ; People v. Johnson
(1931) 343 I1. 273, 175 N. E. 394. See also I Wharton, Criminal Law
(1932) 197, sec. 143.
43. People v. Goldberg (1922) 302 Ill. 559, 135 N. E. 84.
44. Sharer v. People (1935) 96 Colo. 483, 44 P. (2d) 914; Regina v,
Bradford (1862) 2 Fost. & F. 859, 175 Eng. Rep. 1321.
45. Supra, note 41. 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1164, sec. 860;
defines forcery as "making a false document, on which suit might be
brought, with intent to defraud" (Italics supplied).
46. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 247 defines forgery at common law as
the "fraudulent making or altering of a writing to the prejudice of an-
other's right" (Italics supplied).
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to defraud any one, is held to be satisfied under any of the fol-
lowing circumstances: (1) where accused had or considered he
had a just claim;47 (2) where he believed that he had a right to
-resort to forgery in order to collect the debt ;48 (3) where he in-
tended to apply the money obtained to the payment of the debt .4
This result has been distinguished from that generally obtaining
as to the offenses heretofore considered:
"In larceny, if the object of the taker is to compel, though
in an irregular way, the owner of the goods to do what the
law requires him to do with them, there is no legal principle
rendering the act a felony." In a case of theft, the accused,
by means of taking the property of his debtor, compels the
payment of a debt. This is a matter between the debtor and
creditor, and third parties are not involved. But had the
accused in a theft case taken the property of another party
to pay the debt due him from his debtor he would not be
guiltless, because he could not appropriate the property of
one man to pay the debt of another. In Young's case [Young
v. State, a robbery case] the justification of the principle
laid down is found in the fact that it is not a fraudulent
appropriation; it is an appropriation to pay a debt, which
relieves it of fraud. This might be the case for robbery for
it is but an enhanced case of theft. But, unfortunately, in
forgery * * * the third party is the injured one."
False Pretenses. False pretenses, being exclusively a statutory
crime, must be viewed on a different basis from the preceding
offenses. The injury lies in the intent to defraud.5 ' The principle
applied is that if the sole purpose of a false pretense is to pro-
cure from the person deceived the performance of a duty owed
by him to the creditor, as for example the payment of a liqui-
47. Bush v. State (1884) 77 Ala. 83; Curtis v. State (1898) 118 Ala.
125, 24 So. 111; Claiborne v. State (1888) 51 Ark. 88, 9 S. W. 851;
Quertermous v. State (1914) 114 Ark. 452, 170 S. W. 225; People v. Ritten-
house (1922) 56 Cal. App. 541, 206 Pac. 86; State v. Wooderd (1866) 20
Iowa 541; People v. Meyer (1919) 289 Ill. 184, 124 N. E. 447; Common-
wealth v. Peakes (1919) 231 Mass. 449, 121 N. E. 420; People v. Mingey
(1907) 118 App. Div. 652, 103 N. Y. S. 627; Plemons v. State (1903) 44
Tex. Cr. Rep. 555, 72 S. W. 854; Morville v. State (1911) 63 Tex. Cr. Rep.
551, 141 S. W. 98.
48. Commonwealth v. Peakes (1919) 231 Mass. 449, 121 N. E. 420.
49. Claiborne v. State (1888) 51 Ark. 88, 9 S. W. 851; Regina v. Wilson
(N. P. 1847) 2 C. & K. 527, 61 E. C. L. 527, 175 Eng. Rep. 219; People
v. Meyer (1919) 289 Ill. 184, 124 N. E. 447; People v. Mingey (1907) 118
App. Div. 652, 103 N. Y. S. 627; Morville v. State (1911) 63 Tex. Cr. Rep.
551, 141 S. W. 98.
50. Plemons v. State (1903) 44 Tex. Cr. Rep. 555, 72 S. W. 854 (Italics
supplied). The internal quotation is from 1 Bishop, Criminal Law (8th ed.
1892) 896. Young v. State is discussed supra, at note 9.
51. People v. Haynes (1835) 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 546, 28 Am. Dec. 530;
Brown v. People (1879) 16 Hun. (N. Y.) 537.
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dated debt which is in fact rightfully due, there is no intention
to defraud. 2 The argument advanced in favor of this conclusion
is that "a falsehood does not necessarily imply an intent to de-
fraud, for it may be uttered to secure a right, and, however much
and severely it may be reprobated in ethics, the law does not as-
sume to punish moral delinquencies as such."' 3 Disregarding
ethics, certainly it can be said that the creditor obtained noth-
ing of value which he would not be entitled to as of right. There-
fore, the court should instruct the jury to decide whether the
defendant had an intent to defraud and effected that purpose,
and whether, in order to accomplish it, he made use of fraudu-
lent representations and succeeded by means of such represen-
tations"
In a case where the alleged creditor relies upon a fraudulently
created debt, the defense does not hold.55 The defense is avail-
able, on principles discussed above, only where there is an ascer-
tained sum due, and not where the debt is unliquidated or entirely
fictitious.50
It has been held, however, that when the defendant did the
acts which the statute declared to constitute the crime of false
pretenses, he committed an offense against the state, and there-
fore could properly be indicted and punished without regard to
the intent to collect a debt under which he acted.57
Embezzlement. To constitute embezzlement, there must be, as
in larceny and robbery, a fraudulent intent to deprive the owner
of his property.58 If the property is converted without conceal-
ment and under a bona fide claim of right, an action for con-
version may lie,," but the conversion, in most jurisdictions, is not
embezzlement, as the gist of the crime is lacking.60 While it is
52. Rex v. Williams (N. P. 1836) 7 C. & P. 354, 173 Eng. Rep. 158,
where a servant made a false representation to obtain payment of debt
due his master; Commonwealth v. Jeffries (1863) 7 Allen (89 Mass.) 568;
Commonwealth v. McDuffy (1879) 126 Mass. 407; People v. Getchell (1859)
6 Mich. 496; People v. Genung (1833) 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 18, 25 Am. Dec.
594; People v. Thomas (1842) 3 Hill (N. Y.) 169; Commonwealth v. Thomp-
son (1843) 2 Clark (Pa.) 33; Commonwealth v. Henry (1853) 22 Pa. 253;
State v. Hurst (1877) 11 W. Va. 54, 3 Am. Cr. Rep. 100; State v. Wl-
liams (1910) 68 W. Va. 86, 69 S. E. 474, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420.
53. People v. Getchell (1859) 6 Mich. 496, 504.
54. Commonwealth v. MeDuffy (1879) 126 Mass. 467.
55. Commonwealth v. Burton (1903) 183 Mass. 461, 67 N. E. 419.
56. Ibid.
57. Commonwealth v. Coleman (1915) 60 Pa. Super. 512, 519 (but this
case could have been decided solely on grounds of a fraudulent debt).
58. Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 374, sec. 116.
59. See People v. Lapique (1898) 120 Cal. 25, 52 Pac. 40.
60. People v. Lapique (1898) 120 Cal. 25, 52 Pac. 40; People v. Ephraim
(1926) 77 Cal. App. 29, 245 Pac. 769; State v. Lanzon (1910) 83 Conn.
449, 76 Atl. 1095; State v. Collins (1894) 1 Marv. (Del.) 536, 41 Atl. 144;
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immaterial whether the indebtedness, if any, be for a liquidated
amount,," the appropriation must be in good faith, and not merely
in reliance upon a trumped-up claim.62 Mere absence of conceal-
ment and secrecy is no defense if there is a fraudulent intent
and no claim of right. 3
Some courts hold that the claim of right must be based on
reasonable grounds.6" Others require that the conversion be for
the purpose of obtaining security and not for the taker's own
use.65 They find, in substance, that when one undertakes to in-
sure himself against loss in the honest belief that he has a claim
against another, there is a criminal conversion, though he acts
in good faith. It is submitted that such an unauthorized conver-
sion may be wrongful and in derogation of an existing civil right,
yet not felonious or criminal because of the absence of any intent
to commit a crime.
There is a considerable body of statutory law which expressly
provides that the appropriation of property to satisfy an offset
against the owner is not a defense to the charge of embezzle-
ment,66 although it may constitute a defense to the charge of
larceny.6 7
Conclusion. According to the general principles of the Anglo-
American common law, the state should punish crimes. For its
own welfare it is obligated to prevent further offenses and to
protect the public, while at the same time it must reform offend-
ers, terrify others, and teach law by example.68
Staples v. Johnson (1905) 25 App. D. C. 155; Eatman v. State (1904) 48
Fla. 21, 37 So. 576; Brown v. State (1926) 97 Fla. 538, 109 So. 627;
Brannon v. State (1929) 97 Fla. 488, 121 So. 793; Dunavant v. Common-
wealth (1911) 114 Ky. 210, 137 S. W. 1051; Ross & Co. v. Innis (1864)
35 Ill. 487, 85 Am. Dec. 373; State v. Reilly (1877) 4 Mo. App. 392; Hanna
v. Minn. L. Ins.' Co. (1912) 241 Mo. 384, 145 S. W. 412; State v. McCawley
(Mo. 1915) 180 S. W. 869; Smith v. Smith (1912) 45 Mont. 535, 125 Pac.
987; Van Etten v. State (1888) 24 Neb. 734, 40 N. W. 289, 1 L. R. A.
669; People v. Hopkins (1908) 126 App. Div. 843, 111 N. Y. S. 423; State
v. Barnett (1914) 98 S. C. 170, 82 S. E. 795; State v. Lewis (1903) 31
Wash. 75, 71 Pac. 778.
61. Staples v. Johnson (1905) 25 App. D. C. 155.
62. LeMaster v. People (1913) 54 Colo. 416, 131 Pac. 269; State v. Reilly
(1877) 4 Mo. App. 392.
63. People v. Connelly (1894) 4 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 858, 38 Pac. 42; Smith
v. Smith (1895) 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 265, 30 S. W. 236.
64. People v. Hughes (1926) 79 Cal. App. 697, 250 Pac. 869; State v.
Mannix (1879) 9 Ohio Dec. 667.
65. People v. Husband (1877) 36 Mich. 306; State v. Lewis (1903) 31
Wash. 75, 71 Pac. 778.
66. Cal. Penal Code (1937) sec. 511; N. Y. Penal Code (1930) see. 1306,
the last sentence of which provides that the section "shall not excuse the
retention of the property of another to offset or pay demands held against
him"; Okla. Rev. Laws (1910) sec. 2678.
67. People v. Morley (1928) 89 Cal. App. 451, 265 Pac. 276.
68. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1.
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In order to reach this goal under this orthodox theory it is
imperative that the law recognize that a crime consists of an
act and an intent.b The question of intent is the more difficult
and important one. If this element is lacking, the general rule
is that no offense has been committed.7 0 This rule is not only
humane, but a contrary one would be opposed to all the princi-
ples which underlie human conduct as respects the bearing of
individuals towards each other, and also as regards their position
towards the state. Accordingly, when wrongful intent is lacking,
the act or omission which otherwise would constitute an offense
is non-criminal.
It is submitted that no general lawless condition would result
from giving full effect to this requirement of the mental element
in criminal law by allowing the extralegal collection of a valid
debt.71 Chaos has not followed from allowing one to take a spe-
cific chattel under a claim of right ;7' that it would not result in
this analogous situation has been proved in a majority of the
states.
In jurisdictions where this defense is not allowed, severe penal-
ties are inflictbd for acts in pursuance of collecting a debt.7 3 Fre-
quently there are extenuating circumstances which justify leni-
ency. 4 These facts are ignored, because as a defense to the major
crimes of larceny, robbery, forgery, false pietenses, or embezzle-
ment they are not generally noticed in the applicable statutes.75
Until this situation is remedied, the punishment will remain in
such states far out of proportion to the crime.70
MILTON H. ARONSON.
69. Miller, Crimia;al Law (1934) 52, see. 14.
70. Id. at 16, sec. 2.
71. Contra: Note (1909) 135 Am. St. Rep. 486; Comment (1923) 28 U.
of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 35; Comment (1933) 24 J. Am. Inst. of Crim. L. &
Criminology 776; Comment (1934) 6 Miss. L. J. 431.
72. Courts are unanimous on this point. Nickerson v. State (1929) 22
Ala. App. 640, 119 So. 243; Burke v. Watts (1922) 188 Cal. 118, 204 Pac.
528; Jarvis v. State (1917) 73 Fla. 652, 74 So. 796; Baugh v. State (1929)
200 Ind. 585, 165 N. E. 434; State v. Authement (1916) 139 La. 1070, 72
So. 739; Stanley v. Prince (1919) 118 'Me. 360, 108 Atl. 328; People v.
Shaunding (1934) 268 Mich. 218, 255 N. W. 770; State v. Homes (1852)
17 Mo. 379, 57 Am. Dec. 269; State v. Post (1929) 152 Wash. 393, 278
Pac. 164. This theory is even recognized by statute in many instances.
Okla. Rev. Laws (1910) sec. 2678 provides: "Upon the prosecution for em-
bezzlement it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated in
good faith, even though such claim is untenable."
73. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 4065 (larceny), sec. 4058 (robbery), sec.
4025 (forgery).
74. See notes 28 to 31, supra.
75. See N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930) 1675, ch. 41, secs. 1306, 1307;
also see Okla. statute, quoted supra, note 72.
76. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1, n. 1, gives authority to prove
that the "punishment should be proportionate to the crime."
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